En el blog de filosofía del New York Times, "The Stone", Joel Marks confiesa haberse convertido recientemente a una forma de relativismo moral (sí digo "convertido" así como de conversión religiosa). Marks, por lo que dice se dédicaba al esutdio de la ética, a la definición de o que está bien y está mal. Sin embargo, dice haber caído en cuenta que la claridad moral pese a no provenir de una fuente divina, está estrucutrada de la misma manera a través de principios que dan certidumbre moral. Marks argumenta que sigue ceyendo en las cosas que creía antes, y las sigue considerando valiosos. Sin embargo ya no cree tener un accesos privilegiado a lo que es ni verdad, ni correcto. Por eso la parte que más me gustó es la siguiente, en la que reconoce las consecuencias prácticas de su cambio de actitud, y que una vez más, me llevan a preguntarme ¿el relativismo no es una precondición de la conversación democrática?
So nothing has changed, and everything has changed. For while my desires are the same, my manner of trying to implement them has altered radically. I now acknowledge that I cannot count on either God or morality to back up my personal preferences or clinch the case in any argument. I am simply no longer in the business of trying to derive an ought from an is. I must accept that other people sometimes have opposed preferences, even when we are agreed on all the relevant facts and are reasoning correctly.
My outlook has therefore become more practical: I desire to influence the world in such a way that my desires have a greater likelihood of being realized. This implies being an active citizen. But there is still plenty of room for the sorts of activities and engagements that characterize the life of a philosophical ethicist. For one thing, I retain my strong preference for honest dialectical dealings in a context of mutual respect. It’s just that I am no longer giving premises in moral arguments; rather, I am offering considerations to help us figure out what to do. I am not attempting to justify anything; I am trying to motivate informed and reflective choices.
and that by itself, despite the fact it entails a deep metaphysical perspective on the access to truth and moral action, is not a moral or religious view, it is rational, morally neutral, autonomous, and independent of any political consideration. this we can either call god, truth, or pragmatism.
Publicado por: jose ahumada | 23/08/11 en 13:33